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Introduction
In 1939, Winston Churchill, then serving the United Kingdom as First Lord
of the Admiralty, famously held that Russia was “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery,
inside an enigma” (Cowell, 2008). Currently, many in the West would feel inclined
to agree with this sentiment, as Russia’s actions often bemuse and surprise Western
laypeople and specialists alike. One must look no further for evidence of this reality
than Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent incursion into the Donbas
region; these engagements caught an overwhelmingly languid West by surprise, as
evidenced by the West’s collective lackluster response to Russia’s bellicosity.
Russia is not, as Churchill holds, so much an enigma, as it is misunderstood.
Endemic to Western policymakers is a fundamental misunderstanding of why
Russia behaves the way it does. Many in the West tend to apply the logic of
liberalism to Russian behavior; these analysts and policymakers believe that all
states should accept the Western-oriented world order of liberal institutionalism
(Toal, 2017). This Western-centric worldview ignores the fact that there are other
factors that nations value more deeply than notions of democracy and personal
liberty. The Russian Federation falls into this category of states. Accordingly, it is
not so much that Russia’s behavior is bemusing and enigmatic; instead, it is simply
that the West fundamentally misunderstands Russia’s motivations in the
international space.
The aforementioned Churchill quotation is, however, only half complete.
Churchill would declare that there was perhaps a key to solving this conundrum:
that key, according to Churchill, was Russian national interest (Tsygankov, 2019).
Ostensibly then, the great challenge to understanding Russia, and, for the purpose
of this article, Russian incursions under Putin, is to understand what constitutes
Russia’s national interest.
Initially, the central question that guided this article’s research was: does
Vladimir Putin instigate incursions during times of relatively low popularity to
bolster his domestic standing? In this article, the term “incursion” will be defined
as follows: Russia’s use of military force or its proxies both within Russia and in
sovereign states beyond Moscow’s purview. This is not to say that factors such as
the weaponization of natural resources such as oil and natural gas are benign
dynamics that matter little to understanding Russian behavior; on the contrary,
these dynamics are often seen as precursors to conflict within the post-Soviet space
and are therefore very important to any discussion of Russian conflict.
The logic guiding this initial hypothesis was relatively simple; it supposed
that Putin, as the head of the Russian state, governed primarily with his political
self-interest in mind. Under this lens, Russia’s national interest is, quite simply,
Putin’s political self-interest. Thus, any decision undertaken by Moscow would
have to be politically beneficial for Putin; the ultimate end for Putin, then, is

reelection. Implementing policies such as state reform or adventurism abroad
would only occur if they would ultimately aid Putin’s chances at the ballot box.
Following this logic, it would hardly be a stretch to assert that Putin would need to
rely on relatively low-cost, yet dramatic, means to reestablish his high standing with
Russian denizens during times of low popularity. Thus, this article hypothesized
that incursions were the means through which Putin bolstered his domestic standing
when necessary. In other words, domestic considerations, namely the pressure to
remain popular and therefore legitimate, were informing Putin’s foreign policy
decisions.
This hypothesis presupposed critical, yet measurable, dynamics as fact.
The first assumption baked into this article’s initial hypothesis was that Putin’s
domestic popularity is legitimate. Frye et al. (2016) conducted a series of list
experiments in 2015 in an endeavor to estimate the accuracy of domestic support
for Putin while allowing respondents to obscure their sentiments vis-à-vis the
occupier of Russia’s highest office. The authors’ analysis of their list experiments
indicated that support for Putin is legitimate; the authors found that “approximately
six to nine percent of respondents hide their opposition to President Putin when
asked directly” (Frye et al., 2016). This finding suggests that much of the support
for Putin is authentic. Whether this popularity is based on reality or an assiduously
choreographed Kabuki Theatre is hardly relevant; neither the former nor the latter
negates the fact that Putin is genuinely popular among the majority of Russians.
The second initial assumption addressed Putin’s response to the ebbs in his
domestic popularity. It supposed a correlation between dips in Putin’s popularity
and incursions. That is to say, in formulating Russia’s foreign policy, Putin was
moved so seriously by domestic considerations, namely his approval rating, that he
was compelled to respond with the full force of the Russian military or its proxies.
Evidence supporting this presupposition was scant. First, according to data
from the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating is consistently high. Aside from
1999, when Putin was largely unknown and unproven in the political arena, Putin’s
approval rating, whether as prime minister or as president, has never dipped below
sixty-one percent (Levada). Second, and much more concerning, was the dearth of
polling evidence that built a proverbial bridge between low approval ratings and
incursions. Take, for example, the run-up to the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. In
the months leading up to this conflict, Putin’s approval rating never dipped below
eighty percent1 (Levada, 2008).
Moreover, before Russia’s involvement in Syria in September 2015, Putin’s
approval rating was consistently much closer to ninety percent than eighty (Levada
2015). Clearly, in the prefatory stages of both the Georgian and Syrian conflicts,
Putin’s approval ratings were such that they could not even satisfy the low
popularity requirement of this article’s initial hypothesis. In fact, it would be more
accurate to argue that these approval ratings and how they relate to their given

conflicts directly contradict the initial hypothesis of this article.
The outlier of this admittedly small data set was Putin’s approval rating
before Russia annexed Crimea and instigated a frozen conflict in the Donbas region
of eastern Ukraine (Brooke, 2020). These conflicts proved to be the only significant
incursions that satisfied the low popularity requirement. According to polling data
from Levada, Putin’s approval rating immediately before the annexation of Crimea
hit a low of sixty-one percent in November 2013 (2013). Not long after, in February
2014, “little green men” began seizing critical facilities on the Crimean Peninsula
(Pifer, 2019). Again, this incursion represents the only major foray that proceeded
a period of somewhat persistent, low approval for Putin. However, considering the
geopolitical and security implications of losing Ukraine to the West, it is more
analytically sound to qualify the Crimea annexation as a geopolitical strategic act
of national interest.
In a last ditched effort to save the hypothesis that was so clearly on life
support, this article turned to yet another Levada indicator. As Bo Petersson astutely
observed, there is a paradox by which Putin’s personal approval rating remains
mainly in the stratosphere, but popular approval of the government remains
persistently low (2016). Perhaps approval of the government could serve as a more
accurate proxy for approval of Putin. If this was the case, and a correlation existed
between low approval of the government and subsequent foreign incursions, the
analysis could continue. However, upon scrupulous analysis of this data set, no
convincing correlation was found.2
Finally, Russia’s engagement in Syria presents the least convincing account
for this article’s initial hypothesis. Using either Putin’s approval rating, or the
approval rating of the Russian government, the conclusion is the same: domestic
concerns did not inform Putin’s decision to prop up the Assad regime.3
Ultimately, the lack of a correlation between domestic popularity and
foreign incursions killed any inertia that this article’s initial hypothesis may have
had. The only substantive conclusion that can be drawn from the aforementioned
data is that Putin’s foreign policy decisions are almost entirely divorced from
concerns surrounding domestic popularity. Putin is motivated by other
considerations when deciding when to engage in protracted or rapid military
incursions.

Theoretical Model
Evidently, under Putin, Russian national interest is not simply what is in
Putin’s political self-interest. Putin’s aggressive foreign policy decisions cannot be
sufficiently explained as elaborate displays aimed at placating a disaffected
populace. Thus, this article required a new thesis. Simon Saradzhyan, the founding

director of the Russia Matters Project at Harvard’s Kennedy School, provided the
stimulus for just that. In an article titled, “When Does Vladimir Putin’s Russia Send
in the Troops,” Saradzhyan identified two necessary conditions for Putin to
authorize the use of military force: “First, Putin has to see an acute threat to Russia’s
vital national interests that he thinks cannot be neutralized by any means short of
force…[second] Moscow must have a reasonable hope that such actions would
yield a net reduction in threats to Russia’s vital interests” (Saradzhyan, 2018).
Using Saradzhyan’s aforementioned necessary conditions as a foundation, the
remainder of this article will develop a comprehensive analytical framework that
explains Russian incursions during the Putin era.
Necessary for understanding this article’s framework and its foundation
rests upon knowledge of Russia’s national interest(s). Once again, Simeon
Saradzhyan’s work provides a foundation for explanation. Saradzhyan lists
Russia’s national interests in order of importance. Although Saradzhyan lists more,
the first three are the most relevant for the development of this article’s analytical
framework:
(1) prevent armed aggression against Russia and secession of territories from Russia, (2)
ensure Russian allies’ survival and their active cooperation with Russia; ensure Russia is
surrounded by friendly states, among which it can play a lead role and cooperate with which
it can thrive, and (3) prevent the emergence and/or expansion of individual hostile powers
and/or hostile alliances on or near Russian borders

The model advanced by this article holds that each area of Russian national
interest is supplemented by a secondary set of yet mentioned conditions. This model
provides an additional layer of critical analysis in the ultimate endeavor to cogently
understand Russian foreign policy so that Moscow’s behavior becomes more
predictable and, at the least, more comprehensible.
Saradzhyan’s first area of national interest is inextricably linked to Russia’s
seemingly perpetual desire to establish a strong state. For Putin, a leader who
inherited a state mired in weakness, reestablishing the strong state was seen as a
precondition for achieving the broader geopolitical goals of increased integration
with the international community and the simultaneous preservation of great power
status. The latter was seen to provide security and stability in the capricious and
often violent post-Soviet space. (Tsygankov, 2014). Contrary to conventional
Western wisdom, Putin’s endeavor to establish the strong state was not akin to the
empire-building of Peter the Great or that of the Soviet Union; instead, Putin
preferred a strong, stable Russia that could cooperate with the West when
necessary, but that could also challenge the West when it encroached on Russia’s
privileged zone of influence. Thus, the strong state was a means to an end;
nevertheless, establishing the strong state was a necessary condition for Putin’s
broader geopolitical goals.
The second area of Russian national interest is closely linked with another
paradigm shift of Russian policy: the promotion of bilateralism. Recognizing the

prohibitively high costs associated with integrating the post-Soviet space, Putin and
his regime realized that it was necessary to transition to a regional strategy of
pragmatic bilateral relations (Tsygankov, 2019). Divorcing the rhetoric of Russian
bilateralism from traditional understandings of the concept underscores a
fundamental truth regarding how Russian views its neighbors: bilateralism, as
espoused by Russia, is tantamount to collective unilateralism. In other words,
Russia uses its coercive power in the region to spearhead inequitable partnerships.
Regional partnerships will only be implemented if they further a Russian end and
involve a partner who is willing to reciprocate Russian interests.4
Other economic arrangements underscore Russia’s desire to be surrounded
by subservient states. The amount of Russian capital in the Georgian energy sector
highlights the unilateral essence that permeates Russian bilateralism. Inter RAO, a
leading Russian energy firm, owns seventy-five percent of Georgia’s energy
distribution company Telasi (Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili, 2015). Moreover,
Georgia’s most powerful and productive hydroelectric dam is also under the control
of Inter RAO (ibid., 2015). These holdings allow Russia to have a disproportionate
say in how and when the Georgian economy will develop. Although bilateral in
spirit, these agreements highlight Russia’s desire to negotiate and operate in an
environment where it is the hegemon.
Nevertheless, these aforementioned partnerships demonstrate that Russia is
not averse to cooperation. As Saradzhyan notes, Russia wants to ensure the survival
of its allies in an environment of active cooperation (Saradzhyan, 2018). So long as
states within the post-Soviet space remain dedicated to reciprocating Russian
interests, Russia, to the best of its ability, will be a guarantor of stability; however,
states that actively undermine Russian interests, or that foment or suffer from unrest
within their borders, subject themselves to potential Russian intervention.
The third area of Russian national interest is fundamentally related to the
concept of the Near Abroad. The term “near abroad” first emerged as a practical
geopolitical tool used to orient scholars and policymakers alike to the region
roughly encompassing Eurasia (Toal, 2017). The term is comprehensive:
simultaneously, it connotes continuity and change as well as proximity and
distance. All nations have their own near abroad; however, few are as convoluted
as the environment of the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, understanding Russia’s
near abroad is critical for understanding its present. Russia conceptualizes, and
subsequently responds to, threats in its backyard. As Toal holds, Russia’s near
abroad is a geopolitical field characterized by myriad actors and territories whose
interactions create a cacophony of competing interests; the field is dominated by
post-colonial states. However, regional concentrations of ethnic minorities who
often find themselves loyal to the old colonial power center create the conditions
for territorial fragmentation (ibid., 2017). Finally, a looming great power, the West,
exerts its influence on the periphery of this environment, further complicating

interactions within the region (ibid., 2017). Obsessed with stability, Putin is faced
with navigating this incredibly convoluted regional landscape. Consequently, any
threat to this sphere that has the potential to undermine Moscow’s established status
quo is met with decisive action.
The final area of this article’s analytical model deals with Russia’s drive for
great power status. Although this concept is not explicitly mentioned in
Saradzhyan’s model, it is a critical component of Russia’s foreign policy under
Putin. Perhaps most important in this push towards great power status is the desire
to undermine the cohesion of the “U.S.-led international liberal order” (Stronski &
Sokolsky, 2017). Russian diplomats have consistently lamented the apparent
hypocrisy of American foreign policy. The international liberal order appeals
heavily to transnational rules and institutions that ultimately promote notions of
multilateralism and cooperation. However, the Russians and Putin are no exception
to this, often feel that these rules apply to all but the United States.
This behavior is hardly novel. Thucydides, in his recollection of the
Peloponnesian War, famously held that in a private meeting between the Athenians
and the weaker Melians, the Athenians demanded Melian acquiescence: “since you
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must” (Grafton, 2009). This quote truly gets to the essence of great power politics.
Russia similarly ignores the laws of the established international order when its
critical interests are at stake. Although many U.S. policymakers characterize
Russian aggression as Putin’s imperial ambitions, the true goal of Russia as a great
power is to challenge U.S. global hegemony, especially when its own interests hang
in the balance.
Moreover, the projection of great power status is an end in and of itself, as
achieving this goal enhances Putin’s legitimacy as a leader. The logic of Russia’s
great power politics is zero-sum. It seeks to make gains at the expense of the West,
and actively seeks to insert itself, be it diplomatically or militarily, into areas where
the U.S. has blundered (Stronski & Sokolsky, 2017).
The nuances of this fourth area, great power status, suggest great power
logic may contain shortcomings that are especially acute in the post-Soviet space.
Chief among them is the primacy great power thinking awards to state actors. To
remedy this, the logic of great power politics needs to be slightly augmented by
providing space for the necessary context and manifold dynamics that are at play
in the byzantine conflicts that characterize the post-Soviet Space. Russia under
Putin is undoubtedly seeking great power status. However, this should be
understood as the pursuit of an autonomous great power policy. What is meant by
autonomous great power status? It simply means that Russia is indeed seeking great
power status but on its own terms. As an autonomous actor, Moscow leaves room
for pragmatic cooperation with competitors both at and beneath the level of the

state, so long as that cooperation takes place in accordance with Moscow’s
interests. However, as an autonomous actor in the often crowded and chaotic
international system, Russia will not hesitate to respond to other actors with force
if it feels its critical national interests are being threatened or undermined.
Russia is not a great power in the traditional sense: it is not on a lustful quest
for empire or on the path to promulgate a global order based on a set of Russianheld values. Instead, Putin is carving out a space for Moscow to have a seat at the
table when its local, regional, or global interests are threatened. The bedrock of this
article’s analytical model is that Russia’s fundamental motivation has the means to
challenge unilateral action and to make the other world powers twice about
interfering in Russia’s affairs.
This proposed theoretical model will be tested through four case studies,
utilizing content analysis and process-tracing. The first case study will cover the
Second Chechen War, a conflict within Russia’s borders that wholly corresponds
with the first area of the framework mentioned above. The second case study will
be of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. This conflict primarily corresponds with the
elements of area two. However, elements of the fourth area are also present in this
conflict and will be discussed accordingly. The third case study will focus on
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. This ongoing conflict will be studied using the
third area of this article’s analytical framework: the concept of Russia’s near
abroad. The final case study will be that of the ongoing conflict in Syria. This
conflict reinforces the notion of Russia as a great power, as it represents the firstever conflict the Russian Federation, the Russian Empire, or the Soviet Union, has
ever fought exclusively in Arab lands (Trenin, 2018). Thus, it will be critically
analyzed using the fourth area of this article’s model.
Literature Review
The dominant literature surrounding contemporary Russian foreign policy
classifies Russia’s newfound aggression under Putin as the behavior of a state reemerging as a great power. Conceptualization of great power behavior has
proponents in the balance of power theory. Morton Kaplan’s balance of power
theory articulated an international system in which national actors achieved
equilibrium and stability through competition and cooperation (Kaplan, 1958). This
theory is consistent with the later work of Eugene Rostow. In holding that the state
is the key institution of the global political system, Rostow presupposes that the
only means for countering the power and policy of a subversive state is the power
and policy of a state dedicated to maintaining the international order (Rostow,
1962). Moreover, because of the absence of a well-defined international system,
Rostow understands the maintenance of order to be the primary responsibility of
the truly great powers, either through competition or cooperation (ibid., 1962).

The research of Karl Deutsch and David Singer highlighted the relationship
between the number of relevant actors in the international system and the system’s
stability. Ultimately, their work found that, as the number of poles increased in a
given system, the number of resources would also diffuse more widely. This
diffusion of resources would, in turn, decrease the probability of conflict. Thus, in
the short term, a multipolar world is more stable than a bipolar one (Deutsch &
Singer, 1964). Building on this scholarship, Rosecrance held that neither the system
of bipolarity nor the system of multipolarity was sufficient for solving the general
problems that plagued the contemporary international system; instead, Rosecrance
proposes an intermediate international system: a system of bi-multipolarity
(Rosecrance, 1966).
As the scholarship relating to the balance of power evolved, structural
realists such as Kenneth Waltz entered the fray. Waltz rejected the previous unitlevel analyses, which framed international politics in terms of its principal actors,
states, in favor of analysis at the systems level (Waltz, 1979). The implications of
this theory directly contradicted the work of earlier scholars. Because even the most
powerful states are constrained by the system in which they operate, the inequality
of states is more conducive to peace and stability than is harmony among many
states (ibid., 1979). The structural logic underpinning this conclusion is evident: a
multipolar world, according to Waltz, is more susceptible to violence than a bipolar
one precisely because the multipolar system involves more equal players, which, in
turn, creates the conditions for more usurpation and chaos.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a dramatic paradigm shift:
the international system transitioned from bipolar to unipolar. America, for a brief
period, found itself as the sole global hegemon. Accompanying this paradigm shift
was a similar shift in great power discourse and analysis. Francis Fukuyama
famously held that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of history. More
measured analysis from Christopher Layne argued that U.S. global hegemony was
transient; the systemic constraints, as first articulated by Waltz, would ultimately
create the conditions for sufficiently powerful states to challenge U.S. unipolarity
(Layne, 1993).
Moreover, Barry Posen was skeptical of the durability of the unipolar
system, arguing that the unipolar system is plagued by a “self-abrasive” structure
that will ultimately create the conditions for its own demise (Posen, 2011). Finally,
Randall Schweller contends that, absent a legitimate check on the unipole, the
international system will be characterized by increased randomness and disarray;
as this disorder reaches a crescendo, the international system will revert to
multipolarity (Schweller, 2010). However, none of the actors in this novel
multipolar arrangement will have any incentive to balance and seek relative military
power (ibid., 2010). Thus, Schweller advances a slightly altered conception of the
multipolar system after unipolarity.

Other scholars hold the opposite. Stephen Walt held that hard balancing
against the unipolar United States was unlikely. Instead, less consequential actors
will, at most, engage in soft balancing in which they accept the international
distribution of power but endeavor to obtain better outcomes within it; yet another
option, Walt holds, is leash slipping: states form coalitions not to usurp the global
hegemon, but to gain instead a sense of autonomy and hedge against future
uncertainties (Walt, 2005). Likewise, John Ikenberry holds that the unipolar system
can be preserved. Ikenberry contends that the stability of the unipolar system is
contingent upon the behavior of the unipole itself: because the unipole wields such
disproportionate power in the system, its behavior will have the most significant
impact on the preservation of the system (2011). Ultimately, the contemporary
discourse surrounding great power politics is robust. Despite competing
conceptions of great power dynamics, relevant actors within the system, and the
system’s constraints, the theory rests on firm ground. Accordingly, discussions of
Russia as a great power are wholly founded.
Examples linking Putin’s foreign policy rhetoric to the actions of a state
actively reclaiming its seat at the proverbial great power table are plenty. Even
Putin himself, as Andrei Tsygankov points out, has highlighted the exigency
surrounding Russia’s desire to be perceived as a great power: “[s]uch a country as
Russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays as a great
power. During all of its times of weakness … Russia was invariably confronted
with the threat of disintegration” (Tsygankov, 2005).
For many scholars, the experience of the Russo-Georgian war crystallized
the notion that the Russian Federation under Putin was hell-bent on restoring its
status as a great power. Thus, it is unsurprising that the events that unfolded in
Ukraine were understood in a similar vein. For example, writing in Foreign Affairs,
John Mearsheimer opined that the Western consensus holds that the blame for the
Ukraine crisis lies exclusively with Russia: “Russian President Vladimir Putin, the
argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the
Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other
countries in eastern Europe” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Ultimately, the contemporary
analysis of Russian behavior under Putin firmly places the Federation at the table
with the world’s other great powers; the means through which Putin achieved this
feat will be further discussed in the subsequent case studies.

Case Studies
Second Chechen War
Despite mainly being a domestic conflict, Putin’s intervention in the region
is critical for understanding how Putin reacts when one of Russia’s national
interests is under threat. This domestic insurrection, and Putin’s subsequent
decision to crush it with overwhelming force, is easily explained as a response to
defending Russia’s most important national interest: “prevent[ing] armed
aggression against Russia and secession of territories from Russia” (Saradzhyan,
2018). Moreover, crushing the rebellion in Chechnya was critical for establishing a
strong state. Putin’s stated aims of strengthening the state while creating the
conditions for economic growth would be impossible if separatists within Russia’s
borders could wreak havoc throughout the Federation and beyond (Tsygankov
2014). A strong state must have the means to project authority and autonomy
beyond the periphery of its borders. Logically, then, a precondition for achieving
this end is achieving domestic stability and security. In this regard, Putin’s
aggressive rhetoric towards the Chechen separatists is much more understandable:
the pledge to “whack them in the outhouse” is used to project an image of a strong
and omnipotent state (Dixon, 2000). In Putin’s Russia, a subversive actor cannot
even relieve one’s self in peace.
The Second Chechen war can be best understood as a series of counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus that had the ultimate aim of pacifying an
intractable region. Despite the local nature of the conflict, the separatist movement
in Chechnya had the potential to promulgate beyond the Northern Caucasus.
Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11 enabled Putin to frame his actions
in Chechnya as but a small part of a global war on terrorism (Calzini, 2005).
Ultimately, these developments would provide Putin with an arduous, yet golden,
opportunity to “bolster his domestic and international posture” and establish his
conception of the strong, autonomous Russian state (Tsygankov, 2019).
In 1996 an initial peace agreement with Chechen rebels put an official end
to the First Chechen war; however, idleness from Moscow after this agreement was
signed, creating space for anarchy to spread throughout the restive republic (ibid.,
2019).5 The second round of the armed insurgency against the Russian state was
commenced with the explicit goal of “creating a unified Chechen-Dagestani
Muslim state” (Evangelista, 2002). Putin, who was appointed prime minister by
Yeltsin several days after the incursion into Dagestan, had no choice but to crush
the bourgeoning insurgency (ibid., 2002). This conflict provided Putin with the
clearest opportunity to establish a strong state. It satisfied both of Saradzhyan’s
necessary conditions for armed aggression: first, according to our model, the
conflict represented an “acute threat to Russia’s vital national interest [that] could
not be neutralized by any means short of force” (Saradzhyan, 2018). The conflict

also satisfied the second condition, as Moscow had a “reasonable hope” that the use
of armed force would “yield a net reduction in threats to Russia’s vital national
interest” (ibid., 2018).
As has been mentioned, maintaining Russia’s territorial integrity is
inextricably linked with Putin’s desire to reestablish the strong state. An armed
insurgency is a direct threat to regional security and, therefore, stability. However,
on a deeper level, if the armed insurgency in the Northern Caucasus led to political
and territorial concessions from Moscow, it would have, in all likelihood, triggered
a bank run on state sovereignty.
The post-Soviet space is an area of decolonization, and the Russian
Federation was no exception to this reality (Toal, 2017). According to the
Washington Post, at least sixty recognized ethnic groups are within the Federation
(2008). One such example is the people of Tatarstan; similar to the inhabitants of
the Northern Caucasus, the Tatars have their own rich culture and history that is
undoubtedly linked with Russia’s own, yet can still stand independent of the
Federation. In 1991, president Yeltsin told the people of the Tatar Autonomous
Republic to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow” (Erlanger 1992). In
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation
was struggling to prevent a bursting at the seams. Thus, a mere nine years removed
from the collapse, leaders of the sixteen autonomous republics within Russia,
Tatarstan included, were surely following the developments in Chechnya closely:
what happened in the Northern Caucasus would be an important test of Russia’s
ability under Putin to hold itself together (ibid., 1992). With this context, it is
painfully evident that Putin’s ability to suppress the unrest in Chechnya would
directly impact his ability to reestablish the strong state in Russia.
At least initially, the conflict enjoyed a high degree of popularity.
Nonetheless, the reality on the ground presented challenges for Putin’s vision of an
autonomous, pragmatic foreign policy that was bolstered by the strong state within
Russia. The most serious challenge to Putin’s policies during this time would come
from the tragedy that took place in the school in Belsan (Calzini, 2005).6 This
incident would profoundly alter the perception of the war and Putin’s handling of
it by both the public and the Russian authorities (ibid., 2005). The incident, and the
botched reaction, shattered the perception that Putin was delivering on his promise
to eradicate the threat of terrorism in the region and undermined the idea of the
efficacy of the strong state (Tsygankov, 2019).
Despite criticism from both the public and the authorities, Putin would
ultimately rebound and use the Beslan incident as the opportunity to consolidate
the strong state.7 Moreover, a rhetorical emphasis was placed on the strong state, as
Putin emphasized the necessity of military opposition to the existential threat that
terrorism posed to the Russian Federation (Calzini, 2005). Lastly, Putin decided to
exert centralized political authority over the resistive Chechen Republic. The prior

system of federalism was supplanted by centralized control from Moscow: Putin
nominated the local governors whom local legislative bodies would then approve.
(Tsygankov, 2019).
The case of the Second Chechen war provided Putin with challenges and
opportunities to disseminate his version of the strong state and an autonomous
foreign policy. Faced with the direct threat of armed succession, Putin had no other
option but to mobilize a military response. Despite some shortcomings, the Second
Chechen war ultimately provided the means for Putin to consolidate his domestic
power and promote an assertive foreign policy that was skeptical of outside,
coercive influences.
2008 Russo-Georgian War
The second case study deals with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. This
conflict corresponds with the second area of this article’s analytical framework:
Russia’s bilateral, transactional approach with its less powerful neighbors. Further,
this conflict also incorporates elements of framework four, as the inroads that
NATO, and specifically the U.S., made in Russia’s “privileged zone of influence”
ultimately provided part of the rationale for the foray into Georgia.
To understand the relevant dynamics at play in this conflict, one must
understand the convoluted and communal aspects of the relationship between the
Russians, the Georgians, and the Ossetians. The relationship between South Ossetia
and Georgia has been replete with tension since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Ultimately, as competing conceptions of nationalism came to dominate the postSoviet space, the positions of the elites in South Ossetia, a distinct entity within the
Georgian state, and Georgia proper became increasingly irreconcilable. (Toal,
2017).
The Ossetians are an ethnic minority numbering just a half million people;
they speak Russian and Ossetic, an Eastern Alanic language; throughout their
history, they have straddled both sides of the Caucasus Mountains, leaving most
Ossetians living in the Russian republic of North Ossetia; however, the community
on the southern side also formed a unified population leading to the creation of
South Ossetia as an autonomous region in Soviet Georgia (ibid., 2017).
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the relatively peaceful
equilibrium that existed between the Georgians and Ossetians. From 1989-1992
violence engulfed South Ossetia, and it left a lasting impact on the region. In June
1992, a tentative peace agreement, known as the Sochi Agreement, brokered by the
United Nations and signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian
president Eduard Shevardnadze ultimately curtailed the violence (Wolff). The
significance of this peace agreement cannot be de-emphasized, as it provides a
prominent example of Russian bilateralism, namely, how the Kremlin operates
within a rational-legal framework to coerce its less powerful neighbors. Moreover,

this agreement provided the Kremlin with a legitimate pretense for defending the
South Ossetians if it chose to do so.
When the Sochi Agreement was signed, Georgia was a fragile state.
Shevardnadze had just acquired power through a violent coup, and by his own
account Georgia was not sufficiently powerful to intervene in South Ossetia with
force: “To put it briefly, the Georgians were not ready for war, and they were
defeated” (RFE/RL 2006). Despite being mired in its domestic instability, Russia
sensed an opportunity to exert influence in its former Soviet holding. Accordingly,
Russia negotiated peace in the region via a Joint Control Commission (Toal, 2017).
Multilateral by definition only, the commission’s composition ensured that Russia
would have a disproportionate influence in the region so long as the peace
agreement remained valid. The members of the peace-keeping commission were as
follows: the Georgian government, South Ossetian secessionist authorities, the
Russian republic of North Ossetia, and the Russian government (Socor, 2008).
Functionally, then, Georgia was outnumbered three to one. Russia and its Ossetian
proxies, along with a Georgian contingent, would provide the manpower for the
peace-keeping forces. Thus, Georgia was essentially left isolated, forced to deal
with a threefold Russian presence in its own sovereign territory. Ultimately, the
Sochi Agreement proved to be a relatively reliable peace-keeping mechanism, as it
maintained stability in the region for several years. The official Russian position
held that South Ossetia, and the Georgian republic of Abkhazia, were “unresolved
conflicts within the territory of the state of Georgia” (Toal, 2017).
In 2003 dynamics in the region once again changed as the Rose Revolution
brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Saakashvili was a Western-facing liberal
who promulgated notions of democratization and a Georgian nationalist who
advocated for restoring Georgian territorial integrity (ibid., 2017). From the onset
of his presidency, Saakashvili would take actions that both antagonized and
distressed his northern neighbor.
Saakashvili’s desire to reestablish Georgia’s territorial integrity put him in
a precarious position vis-à-vis the Kremlin, which had a clear preference for the
status quo. Seemingly, Saakashvili’s desire to “get Georgia back” was, at the very
least, unrealistic, and in all likelihood, untenable. Russia and Georgia were not,
however, on a predetermined path for conflict. The means through which
Saakashvili decided to establish authority over South Ossetia would matter
significantly to Moscow. Saakashvili, a notoriously impatient man, concluded that
the best way to constrain South Ossetia was by rebuilding the coercive capabilities
of the Georgian state (ibid., 2017).
Saakashvili’s strategy in South Ossetia was to establish Georgian authority
in the region by choking its economic lifelines.8 The South Ossetian president at
the time, Eduard Kokoyty, framed Saakashvili’s actions as unfettered aggression
against all Ossetians and not as narrowly tailored measures to combat corruption.

This rhetoric consolidated Kokoyty’s political power within South Ossetia, and it
emboldened him to lobby the Russian Duma to fully incorporate South Ossetia into
Russia (ibid., 2017). Russia refused to take such actions. Instead, Moscow
condemned Georgia’s aggression. In turn, Tbilisi condemned what it classified as
illegal military convoys coming in from Russia (ibid., 2017). This back-and-forth
would continue for some time.
In his endeavor to forcefully assert Georgia’s territorial authority over South
Ossetia, Saakashvili, in all likelihood, undermined any opportunity for a peaceful
settlement between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, as the consequences of Saakashvili’s
anti-corruption crusade were twofold: first, the campaign sent Georgian troops into
areas of South Ossetia that they had not entered since the signing of the Sochi
Agreement This, in turn, led to the complete breakdown of the negotiation
mechanism of the Joint Control Commission (ibid., 2017). Thus, Saakashvili’s
efforts to pacify and govern the restive republic had the opposite effect. Equally as
important, Saakashvili’s unilateralism in South Ossetia transformed the dynamic
between Tbilisi and Moscow. Saakashvili and Putin went from reluctant
cooperators to two forces that found themselves on opposite sides of the Ossetian
conundrum. Almost overnight, Georgia transformed from subservient cooperator
to erratic agitator. For Moscow, dealing with the volatility caused by the policies
of Saakashvili was an unfavorable development.
From 2004 to 2006, Georgia and Russia would engage in a tit-for-tat game
of escalation. For Moscow, the Beslan incident underscored the risks associated
with instability on the periphery of the Russian Federation. Thus, it became all the
more necessary for the Kremlin to maintain stability in South Ossetia, as an
unstable Tskhinvali could have negative and violent repercussions in the north, and
this would simply not be tolerated (ibid., 2017). On February 15, 2006, the
Georgian parliament unanimously passed a resolution ordering the government to
replace the Russian-led peace-keeping forces with “an effective international
peace-keeping operation” (ibid., 2017). In turn, the Russians would respond
economically. The Kremlin first imposed an embargo on imported Georgian wine
and later did the same to Georgian mineral water (ibid., 2017). Relations between
the two states would continue to deteriorate as Saakashvili upped his aggression.
The second framework in our model, namely Russia’s preference for a
bilateral, transactional approach with its neighbors, was almost wholly undermined
at this point. However, developments discussed thus far are not wholly sufficient
to explain why these tensions ultimately culminated in war. To this end, the fourth
element of this article’s analytical framework can bridge this gap: Russia qualified
Saakashvili’s belligerence as an extension of Western infringement.
Saakashvili’s geopolitical pugnacity was not devoid of supporters and
accomplices. In May 2005, Saakashvili hosted President Bush in Tbilisi.
Galvanized by Bush’s visit, Saakashvili held that it was “the final confirmation that

Georgia is an independent country whose borders and territory are inviolable. The
red line lies on the Caucasus Range, and no one should cross it to this side” (2005).
Certainly, Saakashvili made great leaps in his assumption that Bush’s visit was
tantamount to a blank check affirming Georgia’s right to sovereignty through any
means necessary. Nevertheless, the U.S. does bear some responsibility for
emboldening Saakashvili.
After Saakashvili visited the White House in 2004, Bush proclaimed that
the Georgian head of state was “our guy” (2004). Moreover, both U.S. and
Georgian officials developed a habit of referring to each other as “all[ies],” despite
the reality that no such formal agreement existed between the two parties (de Walle,
2013). Bush held that Saakashvili was a transformative leader, and he lauded him
accordingly; in return, Saakashvili championed democratic reforms and statebuilding initiatives, at least rhetorically.
The most consequential aspect of their relationship, however, was
Saakashvili’s keenness to participate in the U.S. led War on Terror in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.9 Saakashvili’s intentions in supporting this conflict were
sufficiently transparent: Georgia was rapidly pursuing NATO membership, and the
U.S. reciprocated that interest (Kramer, 2007). After Bush’s fateful 2005 visit to
the Georgian capital, Saakashvili intensified his courtship of NATO, holding that
membership in the organization would facilitate the peaceful resolution of
Georgia’s territorial disputes (Toal, 2017). On March 19, 2008, President Bush
unequivocally articulated his desire for Georgian membership in NATO: “I believe
that NATO benefits with a Georgian membership. I believe Georgia benefits from
being a part of NATO. And I told the President it’s a message I’ll be taking to
Bucharest soon” (2008). Nevertheless, at its April 2008 summit in Bucharest,
NATO members Germany and France expressed aversion towards Georgia’s
ascension into the alliance for fear that it would unnecessarily agitate Russia;
ultimately, a compromise would be reached: short of beginning the formal process
for NATO membership, the alliance issued a statement endorsing the NATO
aspirations of Georgia (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Putin’s pushback to the relationship between Georgia, the U.S., and NATO
should have come as no surprise. After all, why should Russia view NATO
expansion in its backyard as a benign development? For the Russians, NATO
expansion is perceived as the proliferation of a hostile sphere of influence on the
periphery of its territory (Toal, 2017). Former Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev
held as much in justifying Russia’s response to the 2008 war: “By declaring the
Caucasus, a region that is thousands of miles from the American continent, a sphere
of its ‘national interest’ the United States made a serious blunder” (2008).
Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, then Prime Minister Putin
held that Georgia’s desire to join NATO was “an effort to drag other countries and
other peoples into their bloody adventures” (2008).

In light of both U.S. rhetoric and action, Russians had legitimate reasons to
express trepidation over the potential aggression coming from the U.S.-backed
Georgian regime. Suppose Russia wanted to preserve its great power status. In that
case, it could not sit idly by as Georgia used force against an ethnic minority the
Russians had vowed to protect, especially if the West would tacitly endorse this
aggression.
Ultimately, tensions between Georgia and Russia would culminate into fullscale conflict. The “Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission
on the Conflict in Georgia,” colloquially referred to as the “Tagliavini Report” after
its team leader, Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, concluded that Saakashvili’s
Georgia fired the first shot (de Waal, 2015). It did not, however, completely absolve
Russia from guilt.10
To a certain extent, the Tagliavini Report bolstered the Russian narrative of
the conflict, which supports this article’s analytical model. First, the Kremlin held
that it would make Georgia pay for its aggression and unilateral attempt to
destabilize the region. Second, the Russian narrative emphasized that Russian
troops had the legal right to be present in Georgian territory through the lawfully
sanctioned peace-keeping mission (Toal, 2017). Piggybacking on this sentiment,
Russian president Medvedev characterized Georgia’s actions as aggression towards
Russian soldiers and Russian citizens (ibid., 2017).11 This narrative shaped Russia
as the legally sanctioned guarantors of security in the region; accordingly, they had
an obligation to respond to Georgia’s aggression.
Moreover, the Russian narrative of the Russo-Georgian War conforms with
the fourth framework of our model. At the end of August, the Kremlin declared its
rejection of U.S. unipolarity with President Medvedev stating: “We cannot accept
a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and
influential a county as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and
threatened by conflict” (2008). At the same time, he confirmed Russia’s
commitment to pragmatic cooperation but noted Russia’s right to protect “the lives
and dignity of [its] citizens, wherever they may be” (2008). Echoing both great
power logic and bilateralism, Medvedev held: “as is the case of other countries,
there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests…[w]e will pay particular
attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries”
(2008). Finally, in 2011, Medvedev characterized the 2008 War as a case of
Russia’s successful intervention to stop NATO expansionism: “[i]f we had faltered
in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and a number of
countries attempting to artificially drag themselves into the North Atlantic Alliance
would probably be there now” (2011).
It is now relatively easy to understand why Saakashvili behaved with such
hubris and aggression in the run-up to the 2008 war. Likewise, it is also clear why
Russia responded in the way it did. As a re-emerging great power, Russia could not

sit idly by as Georgian belligerence and U.S. unilateralism destabilized its
“privileged zone of influence.”
The Ukraine Conflict
In our analytical model, Russia’s third area of national interest is to “prevent
emergence and/or expansion of individual hostile powers and/or hostile alliances
on or near Russian borders” (Saradzhyan, 2018). This area of Russia’s national
interest, and therefore the Ukraine conflict as a whole, corresponds with our
model’s third framework: the Russian incursion into Ukraine corresponded with
Russian geopolitical culture, and more specifically, with the concept of the “Near
Aboard” (Toal, 2017).
The phrase “Near Abroad” connotes a geopolitical field replete with
“difference[s] yet also enduring proximity” (ibid., 2017).12 The notion of a near
abroad intricately weaves together bits of history, fiction, and reality on the ground
in an attempt to articulate a cogent conception of a state’s enduring connections to
a broader region that, at times, extend beyond a nation’s hard borders. Nevertheless,
because of these aforementioned ties, dominant states argue that they should be the
ones who dictate regional developments within their own near abroad. It is
precisely these aforementioned ties that enable the post-Soviet space to be classified
as Russia’s near abroad, and by extension, its privileged zone of influence. Further,
it is the country of Ukraine, precisely its eastern half and the Crimean Peninsula,
that occupies a unique place within this complex geopolitical field.
Historically, Ukraine’s fate has been inextricably linked to its geopolitical
location (Toal, 1997). Ukraine’s origins can be traced back to Kievan Rus, which
was established in the 800s by the Viking king Rurik, and ultimately emerged as a
consolidated and influential state by the eleventh century (Hager, 2019). The Rurik
era ended with the burning and sacking of Kyiv in 1240 by the Mongols (ibid,.
2019). Under Mongol control, however, it was Moscow, and not Kyiv, that rose to
become the most powerful of the Rus’ principalities during this era “by becoming
the loyal surrogate for the Mongol khans” (ibid,. 2019). Upon the culmination of
Mongol rule, Moscow invoked claims of descent from the Rurikids in order to
justify imperial territorial expansion (ibid., 2019). The practice of invoking
historical sophisms to justify territorial expansion would dominate Moscow’s
foreign policy as it related to Ukraine, as throughout history, a majority of Russian
expansionism has been driven by the notion that all Eastern Slavic peoples should
be united under Russian rule (Plokhy, 2017).
This narrative is further supplemented by the patchwork nature of the
Ukrainian state. Putin, in 2008, cryptically declared to George W. Bush at the 2008
NATO summit in Bucharest: “George, you do not realize that Ukraine is not even
a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe but the greater part
is a gift from us!” (2008). For a long time, Russian nationalist politicians presented

ethnic Russians as the largest divided nation on earth and insisted on the exigency
of reunification (Tsygankov, 2015). Furthermore, the Crimean peninsula
represented the archetypal example of the near aboard: a region dominated by
ethnic Russians, but yet evaded Moscow’s jurisdiction.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants of Crimea narrowly
voted to endorse Ukrainian independence; nevertheless, ethnic Russians living on
the peninsula attempted, but ultimately failed, to organize a separatist effort, which
received support from the Russian Duma and robust patronal networks in Moscow
and St. Petersburg (Toal, 2017). Although a tangible and consequential separatist
movement failed to manifest in Crimea, the pro-Russia sentiment that permeated
large swaths of the peninsula remained an influential dormant factor that the
Kremlin could choose to activate at any time if they felt their interests were being
threatened in the region.
After Crimea, the Donbas basin, an area comprising the oblasts of Donetsk
and Luhansk, has the largest minority concentration of ethnic Russians in Ukraine
(ibid., 2017). Furthermore, the inhabitants of this region have meaningful cultural,
linguistic, and economic links to Russia. As with Crimea, the lands of eastern
Ukraine have had centuries-long habituation to the Russian way of life (Sotiriou,
2016). Additionally, the Donbas is a region of great strategic and industrial
importance.13 Because of its status as a region forged by Soviet industrialization,
the Donbas “developed a distinct regional identity that endured after Soviet
collapse...it functioned almost as a third space between independent Ukraine and
Russia” (Toal, 2017). Critically, partisans of both nations promulgated historical
sophisms that promoted the notion that the Donbas was a part of both of their
respective “national patrimonies” (ibid., 2017).
One such sophism was that of Novorossiya, which characterized the Donbas
and its inhabitants as a natural extension of Russia and her people (Teper, 2016).
Having legitimate origins, Novorossiya was a historic region in imperial Russia
extending from the Black Sea to subsume both Donetsk and Luhansk. Russian
nationalists invoked Novorossiya as the historical and contemporary home of a twopart interest group, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (O’Loughlin,
et al., 2016). Ultimately, the notion of Novorossiya remained in the political
margins in both Ukraine and Russia; however, Russian state officials viewed it, like
Russia’s history with Crimea, as a latent geopolitical asset that could be activated
when their interests in the region were under threat.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was
incredibly reluctant to view Ukraine as an independent, sovereign political unit.
Nonetheless, the two states made some marginal diplomatic strides during the
1990s.14 Contrariwise, those in the West saw Ukraine’s newfound independence as
a geopolitical opportunity. Specifically, an independent Ukraine was seen as a
potential bulwark against Russian aggression, as well as a physical barrier that

could bifurcate a democratizing Europe against a more authoritarian Eurasia
(Brzezinski, 1997). Nevertheless, to the Russians the warning was stark: “allow
Ukraine to join Euro-Atlantic space and Russia’s power will be fatally weakened”
(Toal, 2017). This dichotomy would be a mainstay of Western-Russian relations
and it was vindicated by their competing conceptions of the international order. For
Putin, Ukraine’s accession into NATO was a proverbial red line that was not to be
crossed (ibid., 2017). Putin’s posture on Ukraine and NATO revealed Russia’s
fundamental concern in the region: ensuring that Ukraine would remain in the orbit
of Moscow. Ukraine’s accession into NATO represented the most cogent threat to
Russia’s near abroad.
In February 2010, Victor Yanukovych was elected as the new president of
Ukraine. Yanukovych’s victory ensured that an anti-Kremlin regime would be
replaced by a government that desired closer ties with Moscow (Tsygankov, 2015).
Russia capitalized on the pro-Moscow sentiment emanating from Ukraine through
a series of negotiations that would reaffirm Moscow’s influence over Kiev.15
Nonetheless, although Russia-Ukraine relations had undoubtedly improved under
Yanukovych’s regime, Ukrainian leadership would not simply acquiesce to the
demands of the Russian Federation. Rather than follow the example of Belarus and
Kazakhstan, Ukraine denied the invitation into a Russian-led customs union, and
instead proposed “a special, 3 by 1 format of relationships with the organization
that would allow it to continue its integration with the European Union” (ibid.,
2015). Despite this initial rejection, Putin tried to entice the Ukrainian leadership
by including in the customs union offer another significant discount in energy
prices and an additional 15 billion dollar aid package; ultimately, this offer was too
good for Yanukovych to refuse, and at the 2013 E.U. summit in Vilnius the
Ukrainian president announced his decision to postpone an association agreement
with the E.U. (Tsygankov, 2015).
Yanukovych’s decision would prove to be the primary catalyst for the
subsequent developments in Crimea and the Donbas region. The Euromaidan
protests, which officially began on November 21, 2013, were crystallized by the
abrupt and ostensibly capricious policy shift from the pro-European to the proRussian transnational economic association (Shveda & Park, 2015). In addition to
serving as a censure of Yanukovych’s waffling, the Euromaidan protests were more
fundamentally related to the lack of political and economic progress within
Ukraine. Overall, the Euromaidan protests were always about more than just a trade
deal, as the rejection of the E.U.’s association agreement symbolized Ukraine’s
increasing descent into an authoritarian kleptocracy (Toal, 2015).16
The Kremlin did not share the sentiments of the West when it came to the
developments of Euromaidan. Instead of seeing the demonstrations as a massive
rebuke of a wildly unpopular leader, Moscow perceived these developments as
Kyiv’s ultimate betrayal of Russian interests and values in its near abroad. The

Kremlin propagated the notion that Euromaidan was a coup led by fascist elements
in western Ukraine who were determined to move Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit
and undermine, or even destroy, the Russian elements of Ukraine (Hager,
2016). Moreover, Moscow saw these developments as yet another movement
instigated by the United States, akin to the movements in Serbia in 2000 and the
2011 Arab Spring (Tsygankov, 2015). Given the deep cultural, economic, and
linguistic links between Russia and parts of Ukraine, Moscow decided that it could
not lose the region to the West; thus, the choice was made to partition the country
and annex the Crimean Peninsula.
Syrian Conflict
In our analytical model, the fourth tier corresponds with Russia’s desire to
re-emerge as a great power. Suspicious of the United States’ geopolitical
motivations in a relatively unstable international environment, Russia’s return to
great power status would coincide with the state’s ability to challenge the U.S.’
pursuit of geopolitical dominance around the globe (Tsygankov, 2019). The Syrian
Civil War and subsequent anarchy inside the country provided Putin with the ideal
opportunity to reassert Russia’s status as a global power by challenging the UScentered order.
Russia’s links to the Middle East go back to at least the Mediaeval times;
however, Russia’s involvement in Syria is much more recent (Trenin, 2018). In
October 1973, without consulting the Kremlin, Syria, and Egypt would launch an
attack against Israel (Trenin, 2018). After initial Arab success, the tides of the war
quickly turned in Israel’s favor; ultimately, the disastrous incursion pushed Cairo
closer to the West, as seeking peace with Israel necessarily pushed Egypt into
Washington’s sphere of influence (ibid., 2018).17 Ultimately, the Soviet Union
would lose Egypt, as Cairo found itself comfortably within the U.S.’s embrace;
only Syria, Libya, and the PLO would reject the peace agreement between Israel
and Egypt (ibid., 2018). After these developments, Syria became Moscow’s closest
ally in the region: expelled from Egyptian ports, the Soviet Navy began to use
Syria’s Tartus as a supply and maintenance facility (ibid., 2018).
By the spring of 2011, when the Arab Spring movement had made inroads
in Syria, the alliance between Damascus and Moscow had deteriorated significantly
(ibid., 2018). The military facility in Tartus was decrepit, staffed only by fifty
individuals; moreover, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had only visited Moscow
once during his eleven years in charge of the country (ibid., 2018). Far from an
ironclad alliance, the relationship between Damascus and Moscow was, at best, a
pragmatic partnership. Despite these dynamics, Putin would ultimately decide to
intervene with force to prop up the Assad regime.
A superficial analysis of the timing of Russia’s military intervention would
lend itself to the conclusion that Moscow decided to preserve the Assad regime in

an endeavor to maintain stability in the region and to prevent the exportation of
terrorism into Russia proper.18 This analysis is undoubtedly accurate; however, it
is also incomplete: Russia’s longing to re-emerge as a great power also informed
her decision to intervene in the Syrian Civil War.
Russia’s pursuit of great power status should be understood as a means to
counter the U.S.’s quest for global geopolitical hegemony. Ultimately, through
Syria, Putin would make the point that U.S.-driven regime change in the Middle
East had limits (ibid., 2018). Our article’s framework captures the essence of
Russian military intervention in Syria: the primary motivation behind the incursion
was to send a message to the global community regarding Russia’s newfound
position in the global order. Eliminating the terrorist threat coming out of Syria and
stabilizing the Assad regime was simply a means to an end, not the end itself.
Obama, now infamously, held that Assad would not last long after the U.S.
began supporting opposition forces in Syria; Putin directly challenged this assertion
by throwing Moscow’s military weight behind a regime the Americans had
considered illegitimate (ibid., 2018). Suppose Russia could fulfill its independent
policy goals beyond its borders, especially in the convoluted Middle East. In that
case, it could prove to the world that it had re-emerged as a great power. Russia did
not endeavor to eradicate the U.S. presence in Syria; instead, the Kremlin was
merely seeking recognition from Washington. Far from being an indispensable ally,
Syria was still a valuable client of Moscow. The experiences of the Arab Spring
crystalized the Kremlin’s desire to ensure the stability of the Syrian state through
the preservation of the Assad regime. The U.S.’s unilateralism in Syria, which
evoked memories of the Libyan calamity, was an unacceptable development that
required a serious response from Moscow.
After observing the current Syrian quagmire, one would be hard-pressed to
declare any one party victorious. However, Assad and his regime have survived,
and his survival can be directly attributed to Russian intervention. Because of his
survival, Russia is now guaranteed a seat at the table whenever the relevant actors
meet to decide the future of Syria. These dynamics are also consistent with Putin’s
desire to reassert Russia’s great power status. Shortly before Russia intervened in
Syria, Putin, speaking at the U.N., mused over the post World War II Yalta
conference: “I remind you that the key decisions on the principles guiding the
cooperation among states, as well as on the establishment of the United Nations,
were made in our country, in Yalta, at the meeting of the anti-Hitler coalition
leaders” (2015). In involving Russia in the war in Syria, Putin was hoping to find
himself in Stalin’s position at Yalta: meeting with the other great powers of the
globe to reorganize the world into spheres of influence. Admittedly, negotiations in
Geneva and Astana are not playing out as they did in Yalta; nevertheless, Putin’s
intervention has guaranteed that Russia’s interests will not be ignored when the
time comes to decide upon the future of the Syrian state. This stands in stark

contrast with the developments before 2015 when the United States and its proxies
were engaged in a concerted effort to depose of Moscow’s only ally in the region.
In Syria, Putin succeeded in challenging U.S. hegemony.
Conclusions
Russia is not a monolith. Attempting to understand why Russia responds to
some threats with military force requires an in-depth analysis of a host of relevant
factors. Based on the earlier work of Simon Saradzhyan, this article presented a
four-tired analytical framework that endeavored to provide a compressive
explanation for Russia’s military incursions during the Putin era. Our research
framework ultimately identified a secondary set of conditions that further explained
Russian national interest; these conditions proved to be harbingers of conflict. In
sum, Russia will not hesitate to respond with force when its critical national
interests are undermined. Thus, understanding what constitutes Russian national
interest is a critical goal, as doing so ensures a degree of predictability in an
increasingly unpredictable international environment. Rather than being a
Matryoshka doll of mystery, as Churchill famously held, Moscow is
misunderstood. This article endeavored to ameliorate our understanding of the
Federation’s interests in the foreign policy arena, thus removing the veneer of
unpredictability that currently obscures the normative aspects of Kremlin decisionmaking.
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Endnotes
1 It is worth noting that during the Russo-Georgian War, Dmitry Medvedev was serving as president
of the Russian Federation while Putin was prime minister in what is referred to as the
“tandemocracy” (Hale & Colton 2014). Medvedev’s approval rating also jumped from seventy
percent to eighty-three percent, however, that increase seems to merely be the crescendo of a
sustained increase in popularity, as from September 2007 to March 2008, Medvedev’s approval
rating increased from fifty-three percent to seventy-five percent (Levada).
2 The rally around the flag effect is present for overall government approval in the immediate
aftermath of both the Russo-Georgian War and the conflicts in Ukraine (Levada). Nevertheless, the
data is hardly conclusive. First, one cannot determine causality; there are obvious concerns of
spuriousness. The mere presence of the rally around the flag effect is hardly sufficient for concluding
that Putin engaged in these conflicts to achieve that end. Further, evidence that the respective bumps
in polling occurred after periods of low popularity is dubious at best. For example, in the case of the
Russo-Georgian War, approval of the Russian government had actually steadily increased from
2005 to 2007 (Levada). Granted, approval of the Russian government did climb from a relative low
of thirty-eight percent in September 2007 to a high of sixty-six percent in September (Levada). Yet,
and this is significant, the largest jump during this time began in September 2007 and ended in
January 2008, when public approval of the government reached sixty percent. Curiously, the RussoGeorgian War did not begin until August of the same year.
3 Data from Levada indicates that the approval ratings for both Putin and the government declined
after Russia officially became involved in the Syrian conflict. Furthermore, additional polling
conducted by Levada shows that eighty-two percent of Russian citizens either do not follow the
developments in Syria closely, or do not follow them at all (2017).
4 Examples include the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty; the former
exists as a framework for economic security integration and cohesion in the post-Soviet space, while
the latter attempts to establish a similar framework for collective security (ibid., 2019).
5 This disorder reached a crescendo in August 1999, when Chechen rebels, led by separatist leader
Shamil Basayev and Saudi-born fighter Ibn-al-Khattab, raided and subsequently occupied the
neighboring republic of Dagestan (ibid., 2019). Also in 1999, and under incredibly dubious
circumstances, a series of apartment-house bombings went off in Moscow, Buinaksk, and
Volgodonsk (Satter, 2016). These events provided the pretext not only for Second Chechen war, but
also for newly appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to reform Russian foreign and domestic
policy in a manner he saw fit (Tsygankov, 2019).
6 Terrorists, ostensibly led by Basayev, took more than a thousand people hostage in the North
Ossetian city (Tsygankov, 2019). Ultimately, hundreds of women and children would perish in this
incident, largely because of the bungled rescue attempt by Russian security forces (ibid., 2019).
7 In addition to Moscow ramping up its counterterrorism activities in the region, an unrivaled
increase in funding for the Ministry of Interior and Defense followed the attack, as Putin was
determined to definitively bolster the state’s security apparatus (Calzini, 2005).
8 In 2004, under the legitimate pretense of rooting out corruption in the region, Saakashvili began
to disrupt contraband travelling through the Transcaucasian highway with force; moreover,
Saakashvili shut down the Ergneti market, the economic bedrock for most South Ossetians (ibid.,
2017).
9 Georgia was a zealous supporter of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, first deploying troops to
the area in August of that year (Kramer, 2007). The initial deployment would grow to about 800
troops, and in mid-2008 the number of Georgian troops in Iraq would peak at 2300 soldiers (ibid.,
2007). Further, Georgia has assisted the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan since 2004 (2013).

10 The Tagliavini report held that the Russians violated international law “before, during and after
the conflict” (de Waal 2015). Saakashvili, in attempting to retake the South Ossetian capital of
Tskhinvali, grossly miscalculated the response of the international community, and specifically the
United States. In turn, the Russians repelled the invading Georgians with overwhelming force (de
Walle, 2013).
11 Most Ossetians, because of Putin’s 2002 policy of passporization, were Russian passport holders
(Toal, 2017).
12 The post-Soviet space is filled with states, some of which were Soviet constructions. These newly
independent states share linguistic, political, cultural, economic, and ethnic ties with one another;
furthermore, in some states, such as Ukraine, ethnic Russians now constitute a minority in a country
that some view as foreign (Toal, 2017).
13 Under the Russian and Empire and the Soviet Union, the area was a nerve center for heavy
industry (Wilson, 1995). Coal mining, iron ore production, steel production, and machine building
all took place in the Donbas basin (Toal, 2017).
14 Under the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994, Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear
weapons on its territory back to Russia in exchange for “international security assurances about its
political independence and territorial integrity” (Toal, 2017). Moreover, the following year, Ukraine
and Russia drafted a treaty of friendship, under which Ukraine agreed to give Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet in Sevastopol a long-term lease in exchange for Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity; however, it took a further two years for the agreement to be ratified (ibid., 2017).
15 In April 2010, Ukraine agreed to extend Russia’s Sevastopol lease for an additional twenty-five
years in exchange for a thirty percent reduction in gas prices (ibid., 2015). Moreover, in an attempt
to further bolster economic ties between the two nations, Russia formally invited Ukraine to join a
customs union in 2011 that would include Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (ibid., 2015).
16 Despite their size, the initial protests did not shake Yanukovych’s regime. Instead, it was Kyiv’s
ham-handed response to the protests that galvanized protesters and alienated allies at a time when
the movement was seemingly fizzling out (Hale, 2015). Yanukovych’s increasing reliance on
violent means to disperse the protesters ensured that the people of Ukraine would accept nothing
less than Yanukovych’s resignation and subsequent regime change (Hale, 2015). On February 21,
2014, after the Euromaidan participants rejected yet another agreement between opposition forces
and Yanukovych’s regime, protestors stormed the Presidential Palace. Yanukovych was smuggled
out of Kyiv by Russian Special Forces, and the next day the Parliament removed Yanukovych from
his position as president of Ukraine (Shveda, Park 2015).
17 The initial peace agreement between Israel and Egypt would culminate with the 1978 Camp
David agreement. Soon after, Egypt and Israel developed diplomatic relations; moreover, President
Sadat nullified his country’s treaty with the USSR (Trenin, 2018).
18 Direct Russian intervention only commenced after the Syrian government had lost critically
important territories to various non-state actors: in March, Assad’s government lost Idlib to a
coalition consisting of members of the Nusra Front and the Islamist groups Ahrar al-Sham and Jund
al-Aqsa (Cohen, 2019).

